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This paper analyses policy options available for emerging economies to cope with 
the financial crises. A seminal paper on this question has been published by Kaminsky et al. 
(2005). Their main conclusion was that developing countries exhibit pro-cyclical fiscal and 
monetary policies, amplifying the destabilizing effects of capital inflows. The global financial 
crisis of 2008-09 had led to a renewed interest of the analysis concerning economic policies 
responses in emerging countries to financial crises. A growing number of studies have 
provided new empirical evidences according to which emerging economies tend to adopt 
more frequently counter-cyclical policies to face crises. The main purpose of this paper is to 
survey the literature on policy responses in emerging countries to financial crises. More 
precisely, we identify what are the main factors explaining the behavior of monetary policy 
during financial crises. Two main lessons can be drawn. On the one hand, initial conditions 
matter. In other words, the ability to face financial crises depends on pre-crisis 
vulnerabilities. On the other hand, the currency mismatch appears as one of the main 
impediments to conduct countercyclical monetary policies. 
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1. Introduction 
 
The empirical literature on business cycles and crises in emerging markets 
(see, for instance, Kose and Prasad, 2010; Claessens et al., 2011) exhibits two main 
features. First, the volatility of macroeconomic variables tends to be higher in 
developing and emerging economies relative to advanced countries2. Interestingly, 
the effects of globalization have accentuated this volatility gap, mainly between 
advanced economies and emerging countries. Second, if, over the period 1978-2007 
Kose and Prasad (2010) find no noticeable difference between emerging and 
advanced countries in terms of recessions duration, they show that their amplitude is 
three times larger in emerging markets relative to advanced economies. In addition, 
emerging economies suffer from larger cumulative output losses while recessions 
associated with financial crises exert stronger negative influences on 
macroeconomic variables. Such stylized facts must be joined with the fact that 
severe financial crises exert long-lasting negative effects on growth (Cerra and 
Saxena, 2008; Balakrishnan et al., 2011). 
From this perspective, an important question is to determine what are the 
policy options available for emerging economies to cope with the financial crises. In 
other words, how do emerging markets respond to financial crises? A seminal paper 
on this question has been published by Kaminsky et al. (2005). Considering a large 
sample of 104 advanced and developing countries for the period 1960-2003, they 
show that if net capital inflows are pro-cyclical in the two groups of countries, their 
economic policy differ. Developing countries exhibit pro-cyclical fiscal and 
monetary policies, amplifying the destabilizing effects of capital inflows. At the 
opposite, in OECD countries, authorities conduct counter-cyclical policies that 
mitigate the negative effects on output of capital flows. Kaminsky et al. (2005) 
identify several factors that can explain the adoption of pro-cyclical policies in 
emerging countries: political distortions, weak institutions, and capital markets 
imperfections. 
The global financial crisis of 2008-09 had led to a renewed interest of the 
analysis concerning economic policies responses in emerging countries to financial 
crises (See, for instance, Ghosh et al., 2009; IMF, 2010a). It is important to keep in 
mind that two main features distinguish the current episode from the crises of the 
late 1990s and early 2000s. On the one hand, the main trigger of the crisis is a shock 
originated in the financial sector of advanced countries. After an initial period of 
resilience, the financial turmoil in advanced economies hit emerging markets in late 
2008. On the other hand, this crisis is characterized by an exceptional 
synchronization at a worldwide level. Interestingly, a growing number of studies 
                                               
2 For instance, over the period 1960-2008, Kose and Prasad (2010: 68) find that the standard deviation 
of the annual growth rate of output has been the lowest for advanced countries (3.10) and the highest 
for developing countries (5.76) while the median volatility for emerging economies has been between 
these two extremes (4.87). 
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have provided new empirical evidences according to which emerging economies 
tend to adopt more frequently counter-cyclical policies to face crises3. Vegh and 
Vuletin (2012) study the cyclical components of short-term interest rates and real 
GDP for 68 countries over the period 1960-20094. They find that from 1960 to 1999, 
51 percent of developing countries pursued pro-cyclical monetary policy (i.e., a 
negative correlation between the short-term interest and the GDP cyclical 
components) while over the period 2000-2009, around 77 percent of these countries 
conducted counter-cyclical monetary policy (i.e., a positive correlation between the 
short-term interest and the GDP cyclical components). Coulibaly (2012) analyzes 
the behavior of monetary policy during financial and economic crises over a sample 
of 188 countries from 1970 to 2009. Monetary policy stance is measured with short-
term interest rates. A decline in the interest rate in the year of the crisis relative to 
the previous year signals a counter-cyclical monetary policy. While in the 1990s, 
around 55 percent of emerging economies lowered their interest rate during crises 
episodes, this share increased to 70 percent during 2000s, and reached 80 percent in 
2008-2009. Takáts (2012) studies a subset of 14 emerging markets having adopted 
inflation targeting over the period 2000-2011. He uses Taylor rule function 
augmented with an exchange rate term to estimate the correlation between the 
business cycle and the real policy interest rate. He finds that the probability to adopt 
a counter-cyclical monetary policy is close to unity for 7 out of 14 emerging markets 
and is below 0.50 only in two cases (Indonesia and Thailand). 
The main purpose of this paper is to survey the literature on policy 
responses in emerging countries to financial crises. More precisely, we identify what 
are the main factors explaining the behavior of monetary policy during financial 
crises. The rest of this paper is organized as following. Section 1 shows that the 
ability of emerging countries to mitigate the impact of the crises rests on their initial 
situation. In other words, initial conditions matter. Section 2 analyzes the influence 
of the monetary regimes. We try to disentangle the respective influences of the 
exchange rate regimes and the inflation targeting. Section 3 reconsiders the fear of 
floating hypothesis. Section 4 analyzes to what extent the accumulation of foreign 
exchange reserves can protect emerging markets against financial crises. Section 5 
concludes. 
 
                                               
3 The analysis of fiscal policy is beyond the scope of this paper. Note, however, that Frankel et al. 
(2011) and Takáts (2012) find that emerging countries have evolved toward counter-cyclical fiscal 
policies over the recent decade. 
4 To estimate the cyclical components, Vegh and Vuletin (2012) use the Hodrick-Prescott filter. 
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2.  Initial Conditions Matter 
 
A first strand of literature suggests that the responses of emerging countries 
to the crisis rest on their pre-crisis macroeconomic fundamentals and vulnerabilities. 
Indeed, an important lesson drawn from the global financial crisis of 2008-2009 is 
that countries that entered the crisis with better fundamentals were able to respond 
with more counter-cyclical policy easing5. In other words, countries with sizeable 
domestic and external imbalances have been constrained in their ability to face the 
crisis.  
A first sub-group identifies macroeconomic variables and vulnerabilities 
indicators explaining the considerable variation in the crisis impact on emerging 
economies. In this paper, we focus on variables exerting an influence on policy 
responses6. 
Berkmen et al. (2012) uses cross-country regressions to identify the factors 
driving the growth performance in 2009. Crisis impact is measured by the revisions 
in GDP growth forecasts before and after the crisis. The baseline analysis uses the 
Consensus Forecast applied to a sample of 43 emerging markets. They find that 
countries with more leveraged domestic financial system and more rapid growth in 
credit to the private sector suffer from larger downward revisions of GDP forecasts7. 
In a similar perspective, the IMF (2010a) stresses that countries experienced a pre-
crisis credit boom undergo a dramatic output busts during the crisis.  
Figure 1 exhibits the credit growth by emerging region. We see that 
Emerging Europe, and, to a lesser extent, Latin America, experienced rapid growth 
in their credit to the economy. 
                                               
5 See, for instance, IMF (2010a) and Gallego et al. (2010). Pre-crisis conditions refer to both financial 
(ratio of international reserves to short-term external debts, credit booms), fiscal (ratio of primary 
balances to public debt levels), external (current account deficits and composition of capital inflows) 
and monetary (exchange rate regimes, initial level of inflation) vulnerabilities. 
6 For an overview of the variables explaining the different impacts of the global crisis, see, among 
others, Lane and Milesi-Ferretti (2010), Frankel and Saravelos (2012), and Aizenman and Pasricha 
(2012). 
7 Growth revision is measured as changes in the average forecast for 2009 made in January-June 2008 
and January-June 2009. 
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Figure 1. Growth in Emerging Economies by Region, in percent, regional averages, GDP 
weighted 
 
Source: CGFS (2009): 88. 
Credit boom in Emerging Europe suggests the presence domestic 
vulnerabilities. Interestingly, Figure 2 shows that, in Emerging Europe, and, once 
again to a lesser extent in Latin America, the growth in deposits has been 
insufficient to fund such credit growth. Indeed, the figure exhibits a striking increase 
in the loan-to-deposit ratio in these two emerging regions meaning that banks had to 
rely massively to other refinancing sources. 
Figure 2.Loan-to-Deposit Ratio in Emerging Economies, in percent 
 
Source: CGFS (2009): 91. 
These financial vulnerabilities mirror, in part, the bad performances of these 
emerging regions relative to other ones in terms of growth in 2008-2009 (Table 1) 
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Table 1.Growth Performances in Emerging Countries, Gross domestic product, constant prices, 
Percent change 
  2000 2001 2002 2003 2004 2005 2006 2007 2008 2009 2010 2011 
Central and Eastern Europe 5.15 0.22 4.33 4.79 7.31 5.92 6.42 5.41 3.17 -3.60 4.55 5.26 
Developing Asia 6.71 5.77 6.83 8.14 8.52 9.49 10.32 11.44 7.76 7.14 9.65 7.83 
Latin America and the Caribbean 4.00 0.45 0.34 2.06 6.03 4.70 5.65 5.81 4.24 -1.61 6.16 4.52 
Middle East and North Africa 5.03 2.92 3.79 7.50 6.17 5.59 6.15 5.57 4.65 2.74 4.89 3.50 
Sub-Saharan Africa 3.56 4.89 7.17 4.83 7.09 6.17 6.44 7.09 5.60 2.82 5.29 5.13 
Source: IMF (2012), World Economic Outlook DataBase, April. 
However, the financial vulnerability in Emerging Europe was considerably 
stronger relative to other emerging regions. More precisely, as exhibited by different 
indicators (see Figures 3a, 3b and 3b), a significant part of the credit boom in 
Emerging Europe has been funded from abroad. As a result, banks’ balance sheets 
are vulnerable to any shock hitting the economy. 
Figure 3. Banking Vulnerability Indicators in Emerging Economies 
 
Sources: from BIS, International Banking Statistics, and CGFS (2009): 91. 
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In addition, such funding of domestic credit by foreign capital increases the 
currency mismatch of the domestic banks, accentuating their vulnerability to 
external shocks, and more especially to sudden reversal in capital inflows 
(Kaminsky and Reinhart, 1999; Rodrik and Velasco, 2001). 
An important implication is that authorities’ rooms of maneuver to respond 
to shocks are impaired in such environment. More precisely, domestic authorities 
must face two mutually incompatible objectives. On the one hand, banking 
fragilities involve an expansionary monetary policy. But lowering interest rates may 
intensify capital flights and then precipitate the collapse of the exchange rate. In 
addition, private agents may use additional domestic currencies injected by the 
central bank to convert them in dollars, accelerating the losses of international 
reserves. On the other hand, the defense of the exchange rate regime implies a 
restrictive monetary policy. Indeed, higher domestic interest rates may discourage 
speculation against the local currency. But the reaction may lead to the collapse of 
the banking system. The probable outcome of this dilemma is twin crises, i.e. a 
financial crisis and a balance of payments crisis (Chang and Velasco, 1998). In 
1997-1998, some Asian countries experienced such dilemma as Emerging Europe in 
2008-2009. 
On the external side, the global financial crisis in developed countries has 
led to a sharp reversal in capital flows. Many indicators suggest that Emerging 
Europe is particularly vulnerable to the financial channel. Indeed, emerging Europe 
has accumulated large and sustained external deficits, while other emerging 
countries reduced their deficit or increased their surplus (Figure 4). Current account 
deficits led Emerging Europe to be dependent from capital inflows to cover them. 
As a result, these countries are vulnerable to a sudden stop in capital flows. 
Figure 4. Current Account Balances, in percent of GDP 
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Source: IMF (2012), World Economic Outlook Database, April. 
This vulnerability may be accentuated by the composition of net capital 
inflows. Figure 5 compares the composition of these inflows in Emerging Europe 
with other emerging countries. The main lesson of this figure is the high weight of 
other private financial flows (including banking flows) in Emerging Europe while in 
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other emerging economies foreign direct investments represent the main share of net 
capital inflows. An extensive literature shows that foreign direct investments are 
more resilient during crises.  
Figure 5. Composition of Net Capital Inflows, in % of Total Net Capital Inflows 
 
Source: from IMF (2012), World Economic Outlook Database, April. 
Liabilities to advanced economy banks and portfolio exposures to advances 
economies show that emerging Europe are more vulnerable to external bank crises, 
while emerging Asia is more sensitive to external securities-market disturbances 
(Balakrishnan et al, 2011). At the same time, Western European banks have 
increasingly dominated banking flows, whereas North America has been the main 
source for portfolio investments in emerging and developing economies. As a result, 
Western Europe has become the most likely source of common-lender effects, and 
the United States and Canada have become more important sources of securities-
market disturbances. 
Llaudes et al. (2010) analyze the influence of external vulnerabilities on the 
impact of the global financial crisis for a sample of 50 emerging markets. They find 
that pre-crisis current account deficits and the global deleveraging on credit growth 
have played a critical role. These variables explain the fact that Emerging Europe 
has experienced the greatest peak-to-through decline in quarterly real GDP. Gallego 
et al. (2010) focus on the evolution of six sets of vulnerability indicators8 for Central 
Eastern and South-Eastern Europe at three different reference points in times 
                                               
8 (i) Sentiments indicators include sovereign spreads, sovereign rating, and domestic stock exchange 
index. (ii) Real and nominal indicators refer to industrial output, interest rates, inflation rate, and 
exports. (iii) Budget balance in percentage of GDP, public debt in percentage of GDP, and interest 
payments represent fiscal indicators. (iv) Monetary indicators contain money supply (M2), deposits, 
and credits. (v) External indicators include current account balance, foreign direct investment, basic 
balance, external debt, net portfolio investment inflows, and net foreign assets all expressed in terms of 
GDP, and short-term external debt in percentage of foreign exchange reserves. (vi) Banking indicators 
encompass domestic banks' foreign liabilities in percentage of banks' foreign assets, long-term foreign 
exchange deposit ratings, stock price index for domestic banks in percentage of domestic stock 
exchange index, loan-to-deposit ratio, foreign exchange loans in percentage of total loans, non-
performing loans in percentage of total loans, capital adequacy ratio, and return on equity. 
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(August 1998 for the Russian crisis; December 2001 for the Argentine crisis; and 
September 2008 for the Lehman Brothers collapse). Their results suggest that the 
weaker resilience of Emerging Europe is due to the strong deterioration of their 
external indicators while these indicators improved for Latin America. 
The second sub-group dedicated to the initial conditions tests directly their 
influence on the conduct of counter-cyclical monetary policy. Coulibaly (2012) uses 
a logit regression model to identify what variables favor the adoption of such a 
policy. Recall that he defines a counter-cyclical monetary policy as following: if the 
cumulative change in the monetary policy rate between 2008Q3 and 2009Q1 is 
negative. Coulibaly considers a set of macroeconomic variables measured in 2007 
including, for instance, the foreign exchange reserves in percentage of GDP, the 
current account balance in percentage of GDP, the inflation rate, the short-term 
external debt as a percent of total external debt, trade and financial openness 
measures, an inflation targeter dummy, the exchange rate regimes and indexes of 
financial development and financial reforms. First, Coulibaly finds that the 
probability to conduct a counter-cyclical monetary policy increases in countries with 
stronger fundamentals (lower inflation, current account surplus…). Second, trade 
and financial integration exerts a positive influence on the ability to reduce interest 
rates during the crisis. Finally, and it’s the main Coulibaly’s result, the financial 
reforms index and the inflation targeter dummy are the most important determinants. 
In other words, countries with more liberalized financial system and having adopted 
the inflation targeting before the crisis can lower their policy rates more significantly 
than other economies. 
 
 
3.  The Influence of the Monetary Regime 
 
In the aftermath of the waves of exchange rate crises in emerging markets 
during the 1990s’, the world economy has moved towards more flexible exchange 
rate regimes. Advocates of floating regime tell that in a world with prices and wages 
stickiness, exchange rate flexibility is able to insulate the economy more effectively 
against real or external shocks. Indeed, flexibility allows for large variations in 
relative prices that smooth adjustment of output to real domestic and external 
shocks. Costly and protracted adjustments are avoided. Floating regime means that 
the exchange rate is no longer a nominal anchor disciplining or strengthening the 
credibility of monetary authorities. In order to stabilize –to anchor- the inflation 
expectations of private agents, an alternative anchor must be implemented by these 
authorities. Until the mid-1980s, monetary aggregates were the main conventional 
anchor. But given the instability of money demand –explained among others by 
financial innovations, international capital flows volatility, and dollarization in 
several developing countries- controlling the quantity of money does not guaranty 
the control of inflation. From the end-1980s, a growing number of industrial 
countries –for instance, Sweden, the United Kingdom, and Canada- have 
12 
 
European Research Studies,  Volume XV, Issue (3), 2012 
 
experienced a new monetary strategy based on the direct targeting of inflation. This 
strategy has been more and more adopted in emerging countries. For most of them, 
inflation targeting constitutes the new monetary policy regime in the aftermath of 
currency crises. As stressed by Bernanke (2003), relative to previous monetary 
regimes, an important advantage of inflation targeting is to allow a “constrained 
discretion” in the conduct of monetary policy. More precisely, in such regime, 
monetary authorities have a strong commitment to maintaining inflation low and 
stable at medium-term. As a result, if inflation expectations are well-anchored, 
monetary authorities can use policy rates in order to stabilize output. An expected 
result is that output must be more stable under this regime relative to other monetary 
regimes (mainly monetary aggregates targets or exchange rate rule). 
Drawing lessons from the currency crises over the period 1970-1999, Calvo 
and Reinhart (2001 and 2002) have challenged the advantages of flexible exchange 
rate regime. They examine the behavior of several macroeconomic variables in the 
aftermath of currency crises for a sample of 25 emerging markets and developed 
countries. Their major result is the following: if depreciation induces traditional 
expansionary effects in developed countries, it results in contractionary output in 
emerging markets. Calvo and Reinhart (2001) point up two main explanations. First, 
exchange rate crises in emerging markets are followed by a sudden stop to capital 
inflows. These countries suffer from reserve losses and a more severe reversal in the 
current account deficit. The reversal in the current account results from a major 
decline in aggregate demand. Second, in the aftermath of currency crises, emerging 
countries lost access to international capital markets. More precisely, the behavior 
around episodes of currency crises of sovereign credit ratings show that, for all time 
horizons, the probability of downgrades is higher in emerging markets than in 
developed countries. Calvo and Reinhart’s view is disputed by other studies that 
focus on longer time horizon. For instance, Edwards and Levy-Yeyati (2003), and 
Broda (2004) show clearly that larger movements in relative prices –allowed by 
floating regimes- bring to smoother adjustment of output to real shocks under 
floating regimes. 
What are the lessons from the global financial crisis of 2008-2009? 
Anecdotal evidences, based on countries experiences, suggest that peggers have 
been more constrained to respond to the crisis than floaters. Gardó and Martin 
(2010) show that policy stances differed across Central Eastern and South-Eastern 
European countries. Indeed, floaters countries tended to reduce earlier their interest 
rates (2008Q4) than fixers. Minella et al (2009) study the effects of external shocks 
on a set of small Central American countries. External shocks refer to a fall in U.S. 
output gap, deterioration in terms of trade, and an increase in external financing 
costs. Results suggest that countries with floating exchange rate regime experienced 
less output reduction in the aftermath of these shocks. Real depreciations played as a 
stimulus of aggregate demand. Corozza et al (2011) consider the experience of 
South-Eastern European economies. As previous papers, their striking result is that 
countries with hard pegs (Bosnia-Herzegovina and Montenegro) or conventional peg 
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(Croatia and Macedonia) have been very constrained to use their monetary policy to 
face the global crisis. Thus, the National Bank of the Republic of Macedonia 
increased its interest rates in April 2009 (while the inflation rate decreased to zero) 
and the Croatian National Bank did not change its policy rates during the crisis. 
Cross-country analysis displays a more mixed view on the advantages of 
floating exchange rates to respond to the financial crisis. IMF (2010a) shows that 
emerging countries with fixed exchange rate regimes experienced weaker decrease 
in their interest rates relative to floaters. In mean percentage points, the cut has been 
2.1 and 3.4 respectively from August 2008 to October 2009. Both cross-section and 
panel data tests confirm this observation. For instance, cross-section analysis 
suggests that the main determinants of the cut in policy rates have been the levels of 
policy rates and inflation just before the output collapse and the evolution of 
inflation during the crisis. When we interact these determinants with a fixed 
exchange rate regime dummy variable, interest rates appear less sensitive to them. 
Panel tests show that policy rates are less responsive to output gap for peggers. In a 
similar way, IMF (2010a) finds that countries with floating exchange rate regime 
experienced a more faster recovery while Berkmen et al (2012) shows that countries 
with more flexible exchange rates exhibits smaller output declines. These two 
studies stress the advantages of faster adjustment in relative prices allowing with 
flexible exchange rates. 
Adler and Tovar (2012) offer a larger perspective by considering a sample 
of 40 emerging countries over the period 1990-2010. They focus their analysis on 
the “pure effect” of external financial shocks9 on output performance10. Using a 
cross-sectional econometric approach, they show that flexible exchange rate regimes 
smooth international financial shocks, especially for high degree of international 
financial integration. 
Tsangarides (2012) provides the most comprehensive analysis of the role of 
the exchange rate regimes during the global financial crisis. Considering a sample of 
50 emerging countries, he addresses two main issues. First, do the exchange rate 
regimes explain output behavior during the crisis? Second, do the exchange rate 
regimes exert an influence on the speed of recovery? To investigate these questions, 
Tsangarides (2012) implements cross-country growth regressions identifying the 
conditional link between growth and the exchange rate regimes. Conditional link 
means that the relationship is controlled by taking into account the potential 
determinants of growth performance. 
Output performance during the crisis period is measured by the average real 
growth rate in 2008-2009 relative to 2003-2007. The regression includes several 
growth determinants divided in two sub-groups: the first one is related to the trade 
                                               
9 The international financial shock is represented by deviations of the VIX from its trend. The effects of 
the shock on output are estimated after controlling for trade shocks (such as deterioration in terms of 
trade and a drop in external demand). 
10 Output performance captures the depth and duration of each crisis episode. 
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channel (growth rates of partner countries and commodity terms of trade) and the 
second sub-group refers to the financial channel (for instance, the ratio short-term 
external debt to GDP and foreign exchange reserves). Econometric results show that 
pegged regimes far no better, but also no worse, than countries with floating 
exchange rate regime. In other words, the study does not find the shock absorber 
effect of flexible exchange rates. These results are robust to alternative exchange 
rate classifications11 and different measures of output performance. Recovery period 
is measured by the real growth rate in 2010-2011. In addition to previous potential 
determinants of growth, Tsangarides (2012) includes a 2008-2009 output drop 
variable representing a rebound effect. The main finding is that peggers had to 
recover slower than floaters. Interestingly, results suggest that the role of the 
exchange rate regimes differs according to the timing of the crisis-recovery path. 
While the exchange rate regimes do not seem to explain variations in output 
performances during the crisis period, floating regime seem to favor growth in the 
recovery period. 
Some papers analyze the impact of the inflation targeting framework during 
the global financial crisis. Coulibaly (2012) finds that the adoption of inflation 
targeting before the crisis is one of the main determinant of counter-cyclical 
monetary policy during the crisis. Indeed, inflation targeting is a proxy for central 
bank transparency and credibility. The multivariate analysis suggests that a country 
with an inflation targeting regime was from 6-to-11 times more likely to cut its 
policy rate than a country without such regime. Alp and Elekdag (2011) and Alp et 
al (2012a and b) develop a small open economy stochastic model12 to perform 
counterfactual simulations for Malaysia, South Korea, and Turkey during the global 
financial crisis. In the aftermath of currency crises that hit these countries on the 
period 1997-2001, they moved towards flexible exchange rate regimes and adopted 
inflation targeting as new monetary regime to anchor inflation expectations. The 
authors estimate output performances during the global crisis under two 
counterfactual assumptions: 
- the first experience measure output performance if the three studied 
countries had adopted a fixed exchange rate regime instead of the flexible exchange 
rate that goes hand in hand with the inflation targeting framework; 
- the second experience estimates to what extent the decrease in the interest 
rate –allowing by the inflation targeting framework- had limited the fall in output 
relative to a situation in which the central banks did not decrease their policy rates. 
These two experiments lead to a similar conclusion: flexible exchange rate 
and decrease in policy rates have strengthened the resilience of these countries to the 
global financial crisis. For instance, concerning Turkey, Alp and Elekdag (2011) 
                                               
11 For instance, removing countries that modified their exchange rate regime in 2008-20099 does not 
change the results. 
12 The DSGE models include nominal and real frictions, and a financial accelerator mechanism in a 
small open economy framework.  
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find that growth in 2009 would had been -8.0 percent under a fixed exchange rate 
while the actual growth has been -4.8 percent. 
De Carvalho Filho (2011) analyzes to what extent inflation targeters have 
outperformed other countries during the global crisis. He considers a sample of 52 
advanced and emerging economies, of which 23 are inflation targeters. The first 
question addressed in the paper is to know if inflation targeting countries have been 
more resilient during the crisis. Using a panel data setting in which the real GDP is 
the dependent variable and controlling for macroeconomic variables correlated to 
GDP contractions13 and to variables growth acceleration14, he finds that inflation 
targeters outperformed other countries both during the crisis and after. This finding 
is robust to alternative measures of output performance15. In a second step, de 
Carvalho Filho (2011) identifies channels by which differences in monetary policy 
stances can exert an influence on post-crisis output performance in inflation 
targeting and non-inflation targeting countries. Relative to not-inflation targeting 
economies, he finds that inflation targeters (i) cut nominal (Figure 6a) and real 
interest rate more sharply; (ii) experienced weaker deflation pressures (Figure 6b); 
and (iii) exhibited larger real exchange rate depreciation (Figure 6c). 
Figure 6. Monetary Indicators in Inflation Targeting and No-Inflation Targeting Countries 
 
Source: de Carvalho Filho (2011). 
Interestingly, these real depreciations do not lead to a relative increase in 
their risk premium (measured by the EMBI and the 5-year sovereign CDS spreads). 
Such result confirms the credibility effect associated to the inflation targeting 
regime. 
 
 
                                               
13 Pre-crisis determinants include growth in private credit, short-term debt to GDP, reserves to short-
term debt, reserves to GDP, total capital inflows, trade openness, current account balance, exchange 
rate flexibility, and current account restrictions. 
14 Post-crisis drivers refer to growth performance of trading partners and changes in terms of trade. 
15 Post-crisis growth in absolute terms, post-crisis growth relative to pre-crisis growth trends, and 
measure of output loss since the crisis. 
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4.  Back to the Fear of Floating Hypothesis 
 
Domestic agents (financial institutions, households, firms) may borrow in 
foreign currencies leading to currency mismatch because their assets are often 
denominated in domestic currency. Different motives can explain such behavior. 
First, lending interest rates tend to be lower in international financial centers while 
exchange rate risks seem low when authorities peg their currency against the dollar 
(Asian countries in the 90s’) or euro (Emerging Europe now) (Eichengreen and 
Hausmann, 1999). Second, currency mismatch may result from recurrent domestic 
instabilities that render uncertain the future value of the domestic currency. As a 
consequence, issuing debts in foreign currencies is easier (Mishkin, 1997). Finally, 
as stressed by Eichengreen et al (2007), emerging economies may be unable to 
borrow in their own currencies insofar as international investors are reluctant to 
diversify their portfolio i.e. to add currencies of developing countries, besides dollar, 
euro, yen, pound and Switzerland franc. The important point is that this so-called 
"original sin" is not due to economic policies or institutional failures in emerging 
countries. These alternative explanations of the currency mismatch lead to a similar 
conclusion. Emerging countries with such mismatch are vulnerable to a sudden and 
large devaluation of their currency against the anchor one. Any devaluation 
increases the charge of the debt inducing a negative balance sheet effect. 
Focusing on the experience of Latin American countries during the financial 
crises of 1997-1998, Cavallo and Izquierdo (2009) show that more liability 
dollarization triggers fear of floating (see Figure 7) and then constrains the ability of 
monetary policy to respond to external shocks. Indeed, fear of floating implies that 
policy makers are reluctant to let the nominal exchange rates to depreciate after 
negative shocks. 
Figure 7. Liability Dollarization and Monetary Policy Responses 
 
Source: Cavallo and A. Izquierdo (2009): 6. 
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There is a positive correlation between their fear of floating measure and 
domestic liability dollarization. Such a reaction is optimal if we consider the 
negative impact of depreciation on output when the liability dollarization is high 
(see Figure 8). 
Figure 8. Balance Sheet Effect and Output Drops 
 
Source: Cavallo and Izquierdo (2009): 7. 
The higher the domestic liability dollarization, the higher is the output loss 
following exchange rate depreciation. 
Since these crises, the improvement in fundamentals in Latin American 
countries allowed them to underwent a de-dollarization process as both the share of 
foreign-currency denominated debt in total public debt stocks and liability 
dollarization in the domestic banking systems decreased after 2002 (Figure 9)16. 
Figure 9. The De-Dollarization Process in Latin America 
 
Source: Izquierdo et Talvi (2009). 
                                               
16 See also Didier et al (2011). 
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At the opposite, Emerging Europe as a whole increased the currency 
mismatch (Figure 10).  
Figure 10 Loans Denominated in Foreign Currency as a Share of GDP, Selected Countries in 
Emerging Europe, 2007 and 2011, in percent. 
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Source: IMF (2012). 
Figure 11 compares the evolution of policy rates in countries with low 
vulnerability (panel a) and high vulnerability (panel b). High vulnerability refers 
mainly to currency mismatch and to the dependence on capital inflows. The main 
lesson of this figure is that countries with high vulnerability have responded later to 
the financial crisis. More precisely, panel b shows that when the shock happened, 
monetary authorities either increased their policy rates (see for instance the sizeable 
interest rate hike in October 2008 in Hungary, Russia) or did not change them 
(Estonia, Lithuania). 
Figure 11. Discount Rates in Some Emerging Countries 
   Panel (a)     Panel (b) 
 
Source: IMF, International Financial Statistics Database. 
Since late 2008, policy rates have fallen sharply in many emerging markets 
such as Brazil or Chile. It’s clear that countries with pegged exchange rates have 
been more constrained in their ability to lower policy rates. At the same time, 
19 
Response of Monetary Authorities in Emerging Economies to 
International Financial Crises: What do we Really Know? 
 
countries that had more room for lowering interest rates also allowed more exchange 
rate depreciations (see Figure 12). 
Figure 12. Nominal Effective Exchange Rates in Some Emerging Countries, 2005 = 100 
 
This policy reaction in Latin American countries is in stark contrast with the 
one enacted in the aftermath of the Russian crisis of 1998. While in the former Latin 
American currencies have depreciated and policy interest rates have decreased, in 
the latter pegged exchange rates have limited the size of the depreciation and interest 
rates have been dramatically increased (Figure 13). 
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Figure 13. Policy Responses in Latin American Countries 
 
Source: Izquierdo et Talvi (2009). 
Josifidis et al. (2013) analyze adjustment mechanisms and exchange rate 
regimes during this financial crisis by focusing their attention on transition countries 
that acceded to European Union in 2004, but stayed outside the euro area (Czech 
Republic, Estonia, Hungary, Latvia, Lithuania, and Poland). 
Two sub-groups of emerging European countries are distinguished 
according to their exchange rate regimes –fixed regimes group (“fixers”) vs. flexible 
regimes group (“floaters”)- in order to reveal a general pattern how these countries 
differ concerning crisis consequences. Fixers include Estonia, Lithuania, and Latvia 
while floaters are Poland, Czech Republic, and Hungary. To empirically investigate 
the difference in adjustment mechanism to external shocks under fixed and flexible 
exchange rate regimes, we use the vector autoregression (VAR) or vector error 
correction (VEC) approach. 
We use the sample of six emerging European countries in the period 
2004:01-2010:12 and crisis period 2008:01-2010:12, trying to shed some light to the 
wide accepted argument in the favor of flexible exchange rate regimes –that under 
external shocks flexible exchange rates serve as a shock absorber 
The trade shock is included through an indicator of economic activity in the 
Group of seven countries (G7): G7’s industrial production index. As a proxy of 
financial shock, we test three main indicators: (i) the VIX index; (ii) the EMBI+ 
indicator; and (iii) we restrict the financial shock to a banking shock by considering 
the external positions of reporting banks vis-à-vis all sectors in emerging Europe. 
All these indicators of financial shock had been tested separately in order to avoid 
endogeneity problems. 
As domestic variables, we consider the foreign exchange reserves (FE), the 
consumer price index (CPI), the industrial production index (IPI), the nominal 
effective exchange rate (NEER) and the real effective exchange rate (REER).  
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Our results show that countries with rigid exchange rate regimes have 
known a weakest real exchange rate adjustment in the aftermath of the Lehman 
collapse relative to other economies, limiting the ability of exchange rate to smooth 
negative external shocks. But the main point is to consider the way in which real 
exchange rate adjusts according to the exchange rate regime. In fixed or rigid 
regimes, real exchange rate tends to adjust through movements in foreign and / or 
domestic price levels. If exchange rate regime is flexible, the real exchange rate 
adjusts mainly through nominal exchange rate movements. The main point is the 
economic cost of these respective adjustments. Real exchange rate adjustment is 
very costly under rigid exchange rate regimes when prices and wages are sticky. 
Table 2 shows for the all sample period the percentage ratio of real effective 
exchange rate variations explained by the nominal effective exchange rate shock 
during 12 months. We see that nominal exchange rate shocks tend to have a higher 
influence on real exchange rate variance in floaters countries (Poland (98%-90%), 
Hungary (93%-81%), and Czech Republic (84%-78%)). Countries with fixed 
exchange rate regimes have relatively lower ratio of nominal exchange rate shocks 
to real exchange rate forecast error variance (Lithuania (52%-61%), Estonia (36%), 
and Latvia (0.5%-25%)). Crisis period does not change qualitatively the results. 
Table 2. Variance Decomposition of the Real Exchange Rate: Ratio of NEER Shocks to REER 
Variations 2004M1-2010M12, in percent 
Months Czech R. Estonia Hungary Latvia Lithuania Poland 
I 84.32 35.59 92.95 0.56 51.92 97.65 
III 79.20 35.67 83.26 5.06 61.25 92.74 
VI 77.85 35.63 80.94 13.55 60.80 90.59 
IX 77.90 35.62 80.92 20.08 60.79 90.40 
XII 77.91 35.62 80.92 24.68 60.79 90.38 
Source: Josifidis et al. (2013). 
At the same time, considering the ratio of price shocks in explaining the real 
effective exchange rate variance (Table 3), it appears that countries with fixed 
exchange rate regimes exhibit a relatively higher influence on nominal price 
adjustments (CPI innovations). Thus, the share of the real exchange rate variance 
explained by prices shocks accounts for 39%-23% in Latvia, 32%-25% in Lithuania, 
and 28%-27% in Estonia. Countries with managed floating exchange rate regimes 
portray a relatively lower ratio of price adjustment in real exchange rate variations 
(in contrast to nominal exchange rate variations): Hungary (5%-16%), Czech 
Republic (9%-12%), and Poland (1%-5%). In other words, relatively high and 
increasing ratio of price shocks in explaining real effective exchange rate variations 
points to competitiveness improvement via deflationary mechanism. 
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Table 3. Variance Decomposition of the Real Exchange Rate: The ratio of price shocks to REER 
variations 2004M1-2010M12 
Months Czech R. Estonia Hungary Latvia Lithuania Poland 
I 9.44 27.63 5.10 39.22 32.32 1.02 
III 11.38 26.61 14.08 27.28 25.30 3.78 
VI 12.26 26.69 15.51 23.58 25.32 5.22 
IX 12.23 26.70 15.51 23.17 25.32 5.35 
XII 12.23 26.70 15.51 22.99 25.32 5.37 
Source: Josifidis et al. (2013). 
Figure 14 estimates the extent of dollarisation-euroisation in the six studied 
countries. To this end, we use the same methodology as Levy Yeyati et al. (2010) by 
calculating the ratio of foreign liabilities to money. The left hand side of the Figure 
14 exhibits these ratios while the right hand shows the money market interest rates. 
The main striking lesson of this figure is that the higher the foreign liabilities to 
money ratio (the Baltic countries here), the weaker the immediate monetary policy 
response to the crisis. 
Figure 14 The Ratio of Foreign Liabilities to Money and the Money Market Interest Rates, 
2004M1-2010M12, in percentage 
 
Source: Josifidis et al. (2013). 
Two related papers use Taylor-type monetary policy rule in a panel data 
setting to assess the influence of currency mismatch on the adoption of counter-
cyclical monetary policy. Hausmann and Panizza (2010) compare monetary policy 
responses to the Asian-Russian crises and the global financial crisis for a panel of 28 
emerging markets. More precisely, starting from a Taylor rule to determine the 
policy rate, they interact a measure of currency mismatch with the GDP growth: 
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 (1) 
 
where i is the policy interest rate,   is the inflation rate,  is the real GDP growth, 
MISM is a measure of the currency mismatch, and μ is a country fixed effect. 
The parameter of interest is the sum  where x is the currency 
mismatch. Thus, if  is positive, then we can conclude that the monetary policy 
is counter-cyclical. Hausmann and Panizza (2010) estimate regression (1) over the 
period 1993-2000 in which the median mismatch was 0.28. They find that the sum 
of  has been significant and negative (-0.248) suggesting the adoption of pro-
cyclical monetary policy. At the opposite, over the period 2007-2009 in which the 
currency mismatch has been equal to 0.03, the sum of  is negative but 
insignificant. In other words, the decline in the currency mismatch seems to favor 
the conduct of counter-cyclical monetary policy. Vegh and Vuletin (2012) estimate 
the following expanded Taylor rule: 
 
 (2) 
 
where i, y, , and e are the cyclical components of the short-term interest rate, real 
GDP, inflation, and exchange rate depreciation, respectively. FFF is the variable 
representing the “fear of floating” measured as the correlation between the cyclical 
component of the short-term interest rate and the rate of depreciation of the 
exchange rate17. 
Figure 15 shows that the correlation is negative since monetary policy is 
procyclical for high levels of FFF and becomes more countercyclical as FFF 
diminishes. 
 
 
 
 
 
                                               
17 More precisely, FFF uses the 10-year rolling window correlation between the cyclical 
component of the short-term interest rate and the rate of depreciation of the exchange rate. 
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Figure 15. Country correlations between the cyclical components of short-term interest rate and 
real GDP vs. fear of free falling. 1960-2009 
 
Source: Vegh and Vuletin (2012): 22. 
In equation (2), the monetary policy the coefficient , is expected to be 
negative. Testing different specifications based on equation (2), Vegh and Vuletin 
(2012) find that the coefficient  is negative in all cases. Interestingly, while it is 
statistically insignificant for advanced countries, suggesting that the fear of floating 
is not relevant is such economies, the FFF is very important for developing 
countries. Indeed, the interaction term between FFF and real GDP cycle is negative. 
 
 
5. How to Protect Itself against Financial Crises? Foreign Exchange 
Reserves Accumulation 
 
Since the Asian crisis of 1997-1998, many developing and emerging 
countries have considerably increased their foreign exchange holdings (Figure 16). 
As a consequence, the repartition of the stock of the world reserves has changed. 
While in January 2000, developing and emerging countries amounted to 37.2 
percent of the world reserves, this share increased to 50.5 percent in September 2005 
and 66.6 percent in December 2010. 
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Figure 16 Foreign Exchange Holdings in Developing and Emerging Countries, January 2000 = 
100 
 
Source: IMF, International Financial Statistics. 
An extensive literature analyzes the motives and consequences of this 
accumulation of foreign reserves in such countries18. A substantial strand of this 
literature stresses that reserves accumulation responds to a self-insurance motive. 
More precisely, drawing lessons from the past financial crises, most emerging 
countries accumulate foreign exchange reserves in order to face recurrent boom-bust 
cycles in capital inflows. From this perspective, the holding of a sizeable stock of 
reserves may strengthen their ability to resist to disturbances resulting from the 
recurrent capital flows instability. Analyzing the experience of a sample of emerging 
countries over the period 1970-2010, Aizenman and Hutchison (2012) find that the 
positive correlation between output volatility and the degree of financial openness 
does not hold in countries with high levels of international reserves. 
Empirical data suggest that emerging economies hold foreign reserves 
stocks considerably higher than usual prudential ratios (Smaghi, 2010; IMF 2010b; 
Dorrucci and McKay, 2011). Figure 17 compares the actual level of reserves with 
two traditional benchmarks of accumulation for self-insurance motives: on the one 
hand, the three-months-of-imports rule and, on the other hand, the Greenspan-
Guidotti rule that requires foreign exchange reserves to cover the stock of short-term 
debt. 
                                               
18 See, for instance, Aizenman and Lee (2007). 
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Figure 17 Actual Holdings of Reserves in Emerging Economies and Prudential Ratios, in USD 
billion 
 
Source: Smaghi (2010). 
The figure shows clearly that the actual level of reserves holding is 
exceptionally high relative to these traditional ratios. In addition, we see that if we 
consider more stringent benchmarks of reserve adequacy, the effective holding stays 
very high. Is this holding of reserves suboptimal? Rodrik (2006), among others, 
considers that reserves accumulation is costly. Indeed, as such reserves are invested 
in safe international assets offering very low returns; this form of national saving –
recall that current account surplus means an excess of domestic saving over 
domestic investment- is not optimally used19.  
The global financial crisis has offered a good opportunity to see to what 
extent holding a sizeable amount of foreign exchange reserves has mitigated the 
negative impact of the crisis on output. Empirical literature on this topic gets mixed 
conclusions. 
Using different measures of output performances during the financial crisis 
and different reserves coverage ratios, Llaudes et al (2010) and Berkmen et al (2012) 
find that the relationship between international reserves holding and reduced 
vulnerability is nonlinear. Such result suggests the presence of threshold effect. 
More precisely, if Berkmen et al (2012) shows that countries with higher 
international reserves20 experienced smaller growth revisions, the relationship is 
                                               
19 An additional cost is the potential inflationary pressures due to reserves accumulation. To avoid such 
pressures, monetary authorities can try to sterilize the domestic effects of this accumulation, but 
sterilization is costly. See Calvo (1991). 
20 The result is robust to different coverage ratios: (i) reserves as a share of GDP; (ii) reserves as a 
share of exports; (iii) and reserves as a share of short-term external debt. 
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statistically insignificant. Llaudes et al (2010) confirm that higher international 
reserves21 can help to buffer the impact of the financial crisis. But they show that 
international reserves holding exhibits diminishing returns. Indeed, Figure 18 shows 
that at very high levels of reserves holding, the moderating impact on output 
collapse seems disappear. 
Figure 18. Reserve Coverage and Output Collapse 
 
Source: Llaudes et al (2010): 15. 
Aizenman and Sun (2012) identify factors explaining the loss of 
international reserves over the period July 2008-February 2009 in emerging 
countries. Their main result is that countries with financial vulnerabilities suffer 
from a “fear of losing” international reserves behavior. Indeed, these countries are 
reluctant to use their reserves in order to smooth the effects of the crisis insofar as 
they are afraid of sending a negative signal concerning their vulnerability. If 
reserves losses are interpreted as the syndrome of greater vulnerability, they can 
trigger more intensive pressures and more reserves losses. Aizenman and Hutchison 
(2012) obtain a similar result by considering changes in exchange market pressure 
from August 2008 to February 2009. They measure exchange market pressure as the 
sum of the percentage change in the exchange rate and the percentage loss of 
reserves. According to them, emerging countries with a high degree of short-term 
external debt exposure exhibit a negative relationship with reserves losses relative to 
exchange market pressure. In other words, the “fear of losing” international reserves 
seems more significant than the “fear of floating” due to the negative balance sheet 
effect resulting from a depreciation of the domestic currency. 
                                               
21 Llaudes et al (2010) considers the ratio reserves over external requirements (sum of the short-term 
external debt (at residual maturity) and the current account deficit). 
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6.  Conclusion 
 
In this paper, we surveyed the literature on monetary policy responses to 
financial crises in emerging countries. Two main lessons can be drawn. On the one 
hand, initial conditions matter. In other words, the ability to face financial crises 
depends on pre-crisis vulnerabilities. On the other hand, the currency mismatch 
appears as one of the main impediments to conduct countercyclical monetary 
policies. Interestingly, these two lessons are not new. Indeed, they were already 
present in the policy debates that followed the Asian crisis of 1997-1998. As 
previous financial crises, the subprimes crisis shows that international capital flows 
can fuel domestic instabilities leading to deep recessions (Reinhart and Rogoff, 
2009). 
From this perspective, the analysis of policy responses to financial crises 
must go beyond the question of the pre-conditions allowing the adoption of counter-
cyclical policies. More precisely, we suggest considering at the same time the role 
that could play capital controls to manage massive and volatile international capital 
flows. Ostry et al (2010) find that output collapse during the global crisis of 2008-
2009 has been lower for countries using capital controls before its occurrence. 
Indeed, capital controls reduce financial vulnerabilities by limiting both the volume 
of capital inflows and the amount of bank credits in foreign currencies22. However, 
capital controls may trigger loss confidence for international investors. Under such 
circumstance, they may be destabilizing instead of stabilizing. In order to minimize 
such negative signal, the International Monetary Fund should integrate capital 
controls as a possible macroeconomic policy tool (Allegret and Dulbecco, 2000). 
Far from promoting a global capital market that escapes any control, an enhanced 
surveillance and careful Fund management of capital account convertibility would 
help a gradual and successful integration of each country in the global financial 
community. That also means that the IMF must develop its analysis of the use of 
different types of capital controls by member countries. Its intervention of the IMF 
would serve as a guarantor of the credibility of the strategy adopted by domestic 
authorities. 
 
 
 
 
 
                                               
22 In a similar way, Gupta et al (2007) analyze 195 crises episodes for 91 developing countries over the 
period 1970-2000. They interact an index of capital restrictions with capital inflows and find that the 
presence of restrictions mitigates the negative impact of crises on domestic output. 
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